SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
for
"Cooperation Beyond the Network"

SECTION S1: Respondents by City and Sector

	Textile	Machinery	Transport.	Pharma.	Electronics	Total
Shanghai	19	16	45	11	9	100
Nanjing	12	31	38	5	14	100
Changzhou	20	23	15	18	24	100
Hangzhou	36	25	9	20	10	100
Wenzhou	24	31	23	2	20	100
Total	111	126	130	56	77	500

SECTION S2: Protocol for Obtaining the Prisoner's Dilemma Data

QID |__|__|__|__|

Firm name: _____, Interviewer name:_____

GENERAL INFORMATION, READ BY RESPONDENT

The purpose of this part of the study is to gain additional insights into economic behavior. You will make choices and guesses in different situations that will be explained later. To make it more interesting, realistic and fun, we will, at random let participants in this study earn some real money. One of your choices or one of your guesses made will be selected at random to determine a "money-earning decision," and you will be paid today according to your decision in this situation. The amount of money you earn will depend on the choices and guesses you make. <u>You might earn money on any of the decisions you make, but you will not know how much you will earn, before you have made all choices and guesses.</u> All numbers referring to payoffs refers to CNY. The maximum amount you can earn is 600 CNY and the minimum is 0 CNY.

In some situations you will "play" with another person denoted as X and who has already made his/her choice, but we will not tell you about them. So you have to make your own decision based on what you think X has decided. (We have information about X's decisions in an envelope. This envelope will be opened only if one of the decisions below is randomly selected as your "money-earning decision".) X has been informed that you will be asked to choose from the same options as he/she has chosen from. X does not know your identity, and you will not learn the identity of X. However, you should know that X like you is a CEO of a Chinese firm and is a Chinese citizen.

The possibility to earn real money is important in economic experiments, and there are strict rules against deceiving persons who participate. Hence, all information given here about money and other aspects are true and will be carried out according to the information given. Please, note also that there are no "right" or "wrong" choices in the decisions you are going to make. Therefore, make decisions according to what <u>you</u> think is best. Your answers will only be used for research purposes and will be kept strictly confidential.

Read the instructions to each task carefully. Ask the Interviewer if there is anything you do not understand. In each task you will make one choice between two options and one guess.

PRISONER'S DILEMMA, ABSTRACT VERSION

X has the same information as you about the strategic situation and made a decision between A and B based on his/her beliefs about what you will do. You will also be asked to choose between A and B. The payoffs in the strategic situation are as follows:

If you choose **A** and:

- X has chosen *A,* your payoff is **250** CNY (and X's payoff is 250 CNY).

- X has chosen *B,* your payoff is **50** CNY (and X's payoff is 400 CNY).

If you choose **B** and:

- X has chosen *A,* your payoff is **400** CNY (and X's payoff is 50 CNY).

- X has chosen *B,* your payoff is **100** CNY (and X's payoff is 100 CNY).

Note that X's choice affects your payoff and your choice affects his/her payoff.

Circle your preferred choice: ***A***   ***B***

GUESS WHAT OTHER CEOS DO, ABSTRACT VERSION

We asked a number of CEOs who live and work in China to make choices in the situation above. They had the same chance to earn money as you have. You are now asked to guess the percentage of these persons you think chose option A. We ask you to think hard about this and we will pay you according to how close your guess is the true percentage (given that this situation becomes the money-earning decision).

We pay you:

500 CNY if your guess is within 1 percentage point of the correct answer.

300 CNY if your guess is within 5 percentage points of the correct answer.

200 CNY if your guess is within 10 percentage points of the correct answer.

100 CNY if your guess is within 20 percentage points of the correct answer.

0 otherwise.

What percent of the persons that previously made choices described in the situation above do you think chose option A?

_____ (a number between 0 and 100).

PRISONER'S DILEMMA, CONCRETE VERSION

Suppose that you manage a firm in a small town and that you can choose to send your workers to a costly training which will make them more qualified and your firm more profitable. An important circumstance is that the training is only profitable if most of the trained workers stay in your company after the training. An alternative and less costly strategy is to hire workers that have been trained by another neighbor firm, denoted by X. However, this requires that the neighbor firm decides to send some of its worker to training. It should also be mentioned that firm X has the same options as your firm has, which means that it may recruit trained workers from your firm instead of training its own workers. To sum up, the most profitable situation for you is if you do not send your own workers to training but recruit from firm X, which trains its workers. The next best situation for you is if both you and X send workers to training and do not recruit from each other. The third best situation for you is if neither you nor X send any worker to training. The worst situation for you is if you send your workers to training and firm X recruits your trained workers. The monetary payoffs representing this strategic situation are given below.

X has the same information as you about the strategic situation and made a decision between Training and Recruitment (based on his/her beliefs about what you will do). You will also be asked to choose between Training and Recruitment. The payoffs in the strategic situation are as follows:

If you choose **Training** and:

- X has chosen *Training,* your payoff is **250** (and X's payoff is 250).

- X has chosen *Recruitment,* your payoff is **50** (and X's payoff is 400).

If you choose **Recruitment** and:

- X has chosen *Training,* your payoff is **400** (and X's payoff is 50).

- X has chosen *Recruitment,* your payoff is **100** (and X's payoff is 100).

Note that X's choice affects your payoff and your choice affects his/her payoff.

Circle your preferred choice:　　　　　　　**Training**　　　　　　　**Recruitment**

GUESS WHAT OTHER CEOS DO, CONCRETE VERSION

We asked a number of CEOs who live and work in China to make choices in the situation above. They had the same chance to earn money as you have. You are now asked to guess the percent of these persons you think chose Training. We ask you to think hard about this and we will pay you according to how close your guess is the true percentage (given that this situation becomes the money-earning decision).

We pay you:

500 CNY if your guess is within 1 percentage point of the correct answer.

300 CNY if your guess is within 5 percentage points of the correct answer.

200 CNY if your guess is within 10 percentage points of the correct answer.

100 CNY if your guess is within 20 percentage points of the correct answer.

0 otherwise.

What percent of the persons that previously made choices described in the situation above do you think chose Training?

_____ (a number between 0 and 100).

INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTIONS

Interviewer Instructions for Abstract Version of the Game (PDA)

1. 【Ask R (respondent) to】 Please read the form.

2. 【Please observe whether R has finished reading】Let me explain it to you. Here is the envelope with X's decision in this situation. 【Show the envelope to R marked "X's decision in PDA."】

3. X's decision will be revealed if this decision is randomly selected as the money earning decision. You and X will then be paid according to the sums described in the form. 【Point at the payoff information in R's form.】

4. Do you have any questions? 【Answer the questions until you are sure R understands.】

6. Please fill in the form.

7. 【Please look at the questionnaire, check that R has circled "A" or "B" at the bottom of the form. If you see that R has made any mistakes such as making a decision for X as well, explain again.】
May I explain to you again?
【Explanation….Be careful to point out that X has already made his/her decision and that R has to make the decision without knowing this.】
【Let R change his/her decisions if (s)he wants. If (s)he does not want to change the decision move on.】

Material: PDA form and envelope marked "X's decisions in PDA"

Instructions for Guess What Other CEOs Do, Abstract Version

1. 【Ask R (respondent) to】 Please read the form.

2. 【Please observe whether R has finished reading.】Let me explain it to you. Here is the envelope with information about the percentages that chose Option A in the previous situation. 【Show R the envelope marked "Information about percentages."】

3. The true percentage will be revealed if this guess is randomly selected as the money earning decision. You will then be paid according to the sums described in the form. 【Point at the payoff information in R's form.】

4. Do you have any questions? 【Answer the questions until you are sure R understands.】

6. Please make your guess by filling in the form.

7. 【Please look at the questionnaire to check that R has filled in a number between 0 and 100 at the bottom of the form. If this is not the case, instruct R to fill in a number.】

Material: PDAG form and envelope marked "Information about percentages"

Instructions for Concrete Version of the Game (PDC)

1. 【Ask R (respondent) to】 Please read the form.

2. 【Please observe whether R has finished reading.】 Let me explain it to you. Here is the envelope with X's decision in this situation. 【Show R the envelope marked "X's decision in PDC."】

3. X's decision will be revealed if this decision is randomly selected as the money earning decision. You and X will then be paid according to the sums described in the form. 【Point at the payoff information in R's form.】

4. Do you have any questions? 【Answer the questions until you are sure that R understands.】

6. Please fill in the form.

7. 【Please look at the questionnaire, check that R has circled "A" or "B" at the bottom of the form. If you see that R has made any mistakes such as making a decision for X as well, explain again.】
May I explain to you again?
【Explanation….Be careful to point out that X has already made his/her decision and that R has to make the decision without knowing this.】
【Let R change his/her decisions if (s)he wants. If (s)he does not want to change the decision move on.】

> Material: PDC form and envelope marked "X's decisions in PDC"

Instructions for Guess What Other CEOs Do in the Concrete Version

1. 【Ask R (respondent) to】 Please read the form.

2. 【Please observe whether R has finished reading.】 Let me explain it to you. Here is the envelope with information about the percentages that chose Training in the previous situation. 【Show R the envelope marked "Information about percentages."】

3. The true percentage will be revealed if this guess is randomly selected as the money earning decision. You will then be paid according to the sums described in the form. 【Point at the payoff information in R's form.】

4. Do you have any questions 【Answer the questions until you are sure that R understands.】

6. Please make your guess by filling in the form.

7. 【Please look at the questionnaire to check that R has filled in a number between 0 and 100 at the bottom of the form. If this is not the case, instruct R to fill in a number.】

Material: PDCG form and envelope marked "Information about percentages"

SECTION S3: Interview Time

Respondents varied considerably in the time they spent with the interviewer. The time spent on games varied from 7 to 30 minutes, around a median of 12 minutes. Time spent on the network instrument varied from 11 to 45 minutes, around a median of 24 minutes. Going through the interview quickly could indicate a respondent not thinking carefully about his or her game choice. Going through the interview slowly could indicate that the respondent was chatty during the interview, was confused, or had frequent business interruptions during the interview. We were not worried about interview time spent on games, because there are no significant interviewer differences in eliciting respondent cooperation (footnote 2 in the published article), and differences in time spent in the interview have no correlation with cooperation (.03 correlation) or network constraint (.02 correlation). Interview time spent on the network data is also uncorrelated with cooperation (.04 correlation), however, time was a concern because larger networks require more interview time (since questions have to be repeated for more contacts), so interview time spent on the network data is correlated with closure measures such as our predictor, network constraint (-.20 correlation, $P < .001$).

We tested the stability of the cooperation association with network constraint across level and slope adjustments for the number of minutes by which an interview was shorter than the median time, and across adjustments for number of minutes longer than the median time. The two level adjustments are number of minutes an interview ran longer than the median (zero if shorter than the median), and number of minutes an interview ran shorter than the median (zero if longer than the median). Both time variables were multiplied by log network constraint to test whether the cooperation association with network constraint was different in long or short interviews. The adjustments for interview length are consistently negligible. Level and slope adjustments for spending a lot or a little time on games are a negligible addition to Model B in Table 3 (chi-square is 4.90 with 4 d.f., $P \sim .30$). Similarly, adjustments for spending a lot or a little time on the network instrument are a negligible addition to the model (chi-square is 2.48 with 4 d.f., $P \sim .65$).

SECTION S4: Respondent Recall

The importance of network events several years ago raises questions about respondent accuracy in recalling business events and corresponding contacts. The fact that only CEOs were eligible to participate in the survey offers some assurance that respondents should have had access to all relevant information. But not all individuals were in leadership roles when the firm was founded, which might have created quality variation in the network data.

The cooperation association with network constraint is not dependent on a respondent being a founding CEO. The coefficients in Table 6 for founder respondents are similar to the corresponding coefficients in Table 3 for all respondents: cooperation still has a statistically significant association with network constraint. We also tested the cooperation association with network constraint using a level and slope adjustment comparing founders and non-founders in the whole sample. The level and slope adjustments are negligible in both Table 3 models (chi-square of 2.21, 2 d.f., P ~ .33, in Model A, and in Model B, 3.08, 2 d.f., P ~ .21).

The below table shows our main results when estimated only from the respondents who founded the business, either as sole founder or as part of the founding team. This reduces our sample to 388 respondents, or 77.6% of the original sample. Model specification is the same as Table 3, except estimation is based only on respondents present at the founding of the business.

|	Model A Only founder		Model B Only founder	
	coeff	s.e	coeff	s.e
Log Network Constraint	-1.24*	(0.54)	-2.39**	(0.77)
Low Success			-.47	(0.31)
Constraint with Low Success			2.51*	(1.07)
Respondent & Business Controls				
Education	0.08	(0.11)	0.05	(0.11)
Income	0.07	(0.06)	0.06	(0.06)
Age (decades)	0.08	(0.18)	0.09	(0.18)
Female	0.20	(0.32)	0.28	(0.33)
Number of Siblings	0.04	(0.12)	0.03	(0.13)
Percent Family in Network	0.02	(0.01)	0.02	(0.01)
Percent Family x Siblings	0.01	(0.006)	0.01*	(0.006)
R&D Department	0.25	(0.25)	0.22	(0.25)
Company Size (log assets)	-0.12	(0.12)	-0.23	(0.14)
Company Age (years)	-0.04	(0.03)	-0.04	(0.03)
Task Order, second	0.78**	(0.27)	0.81**	(0.28)
Task Order, third	0.29	(0.28)	0.33	(0.28)
Abstract	-0.28	(0.23)	-0.24	(0.23)
City, Changzhou	-0.65	(0.37)	-0.68	(0.38)
City, Shanghai	0.87*	(0.41)	0.85*	(0.43)
City, Wenzhou	0.55	(0.38)	0.53	(0.39)
R&D Department	0.25	(0.25)	0.22	(0.25)
Industry, Transport Equip.	0.34	(0.35)	0.37	(0.35)
Industry, Electronics	0.01	(0.38)	0.07	(0.08)
Constant	4.24	(2.38)	9.99**	(3.30)
Pseudo R^2	.115		.130	
Prob > Chi-Square	.000		.000	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ ***$p < 0.001$ Robust standard errors define test statistics.

SECTION S5: Network Content

How much is the cooperation association with network structure due to the quality of relations in the network. People in closed networks learn to trust and be cooperative within their network, and learn the reputational consequences of not being trustworthy and cooperative. At the same time, people in closed networks also have more positive relations on average with colleagues. The below graph shows the association between two dimensions of network closure: average strength of connection with contacts on the vertical axis, across the average strength of connection between contacts. More dense, more closed, networks are to the right. There is a statistically significant tendency for relations to be stronger in networks of strongly interconnected colleagues (.22 correlation, 6.57 t-test). We also have respondent trust in each cited contact measured on a 1-5 scale (Burt and Burzynska, 2017: 235-38, reference in the published article). Trust is higher on average for respondents with strongly interconnected colleagues (.27 correlation, 7.15 t-test).

At the same time, there is substantial variation around the regression line in the graph. Levels of emotional closeness and trust characteristic of a respondent's network are not independent of closure, but neither are they a particularly good indicator of closure.

More importantly, the levels of emotional closeness and trust within a network do not predict cooperation as well as network structure. The two tables in this section (below the below graph) are the same as Table 3, except the network constraint measure of closure is replaced by average emotional closeness between respondent and colleagues (first table), and average respondent trust in his or her colleagues (second table). Relations with the cited "most difficult" contact are excluded from the averages. Controls are the same as in Table 3. In both tables, cooperation has no direct association (Model A), nor association amplified by success (Model B), with a respondent's average strength of connection with colleagues, or average trust in colleagues.

Predict Cooperation Replacing Constraint with Average Emotional Closeness

	Model A		Model B	
	coeff	s.e.	coeff	s.e.
Average emotional closeness	-1.10	(0.69)	-0.34	(0.94)
Less Success			-0.32	(0.27)
Closeness x Less Success			-1.50	(1.32)
Respondent & Business Controls				
Education	0.09	(0.10)	0.09	(0.10)
Income	0.03	(0.05)	0.30	(0.05)
Age (decades)	-0.03	(0.16)	-0.03	(0.16)
Female	0.05	(0.26)	0.10	(0.26)
Number of Siblings	0.07	(0.10)	0.07	(0.10)
Percent Family in Network	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Percent Family x Siblings	0.01	(0.005)	0.01	(0.005)
Founders	-0.38	(0.26)	-0.38	(0.26)
R&D Department	0.19	(0.21)	0.19	(0.21)
Company Size (log assets)	-0.09	(0.09)	-0.19	(0.12)
Company Age (years)	-0.04	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.02)
Task Order, second	0.52*	(0.23)	0.51	(0.24)
Task Order, third	0.18	(0.23)	0.16	(0.24)
Abstract	-0.35	(0.19)	-0.34	(0.19)
City, Nanjing	0.34	(0.33)	0.35	(0.33)
City, Changzhou	-0.70*	(0.32)	-0.68*	(0.33)
City, Hangzhou	0.77*	(0.34)	-0.72*	(0.34)
City, Wenzhou	0.40	(0.33)	0.45	(0.33)
Industry, Pharmaceuticals	0.63	(0.37)	0.62	(0.37)
Industry, Machinery	-0.29	(0.29)	-0.29	(0.29)
Industry, Transport Equip.	0.37	(0.30)	0.39	(0.30)
Industry, Electronics	0.10	(0.32)	0.09	(0.32)
Constant	0.56	(0.87)	1.37	(1.12)
Pseudo R^2	0.084		0.087	
Prob > Chi-Square	0.000		0.000	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ ***$p < 0.001$ Robust standard errors define test statistics.

Predict Cooperation Replacing Constraint with Average Trust in Contacts

	Model A		Model B	
	coeff	s.e.	coeff	s.e.
Average trust	-0.49	(0.29)	-0.28	(0.39)
Less Success			-0.34	(0.27)
Trust x Less Success			-0.46	(0.55)
Respondent & Business Controls				
Education	0.10	(0.10)	0.09	(0.10)
Income	0.04	(0.05)	0.03	(0.05)
Age (decades)	-0.03	(0.16)	-0.03	(0.16)
Female	0.05	(0.26)	0.10	(0.26)
Number of Siblings	0.06	(0.10)	0.06	(0.10)
Percent Family in Network	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Percent Family x Siblings	0.01*	(0.005)	0.01*	(0.005)
Founder	-0.39	(0.26)	-0.40	(0.26)
R&D Department	0.20	(0.21)	0.18	(0.21)
Company Size (log assets)	-0.09	(0.09)	-0.19	(0.12)
Company Age (years)	-0.04	(0.02)	-0.04	(0.02)
Task Order, second	0.54*	(0.24)	0.52*	(0.24)
Task Order, third	0.18	(0.23)	0.16	(0.24)
Abstract	-0.35	(0.19)	-0.34	(0.19)
City, Nanjing	0.40	(0.32)	0.38	(0.32)
City, Changzhou	-0.69*	(0.32)	-0.67*	(0.32)
City, Hangzhou	0.75*	(0.35)	0.70*	(0.34)
City, Wenzhou	0.40	(0.33)	0.44	(0.33)
Industry, Pharmaceuticals	0.62	(0.36)	0.65	(0.37)
Industry, Machinery	-0.28	(0.29)	-0.28	(0.29)
Industry, Transport Equip.	0.36	(0.30)	0.40	(0.30)
Industry, Electronics	0.13	(0.32)	0.13	(0.33)
Constant	0.54	(0.87)	1.43	(1.13)
Pseudo R^2	0.085		0.088	
Prob > Chi-Square	0.000		0.000	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ ***$p < 0.001$ Robust standard errors define test statistics.

SECTION S6: Social Expectations

	Model A		Model B	
	coeff	s.e.	coeff	s.e.
Log Network Constraint	-1.14*	(0.47)	-2.38**	(0.69)
Low Success			-.22	(0.27)
Constraint with Low Success			2.86**	(0.95)
Respondent & Business Controls				
Education	0.08	(0.10)	0.03	(0.10)
Income	0.02	(0.05)	0.01	(0.06)
Age (decades)	-0.10	(0.16)	-0.10	(0.16)
Female	0.15	(0.27)	0.15	(0.28)
Belief about Cooperation	0.10	(0.18)	0.14	(0.18)
Belief x Abstract PDG	0.53*	(0.24)	0.52*	(0.25)
Belief x Female Respondent	-0.77*	(0.32)	-0.80*	(0.34)
Number of Siblings	0.04	(0.10)	0.02	(0.11)
Percent Family in Network	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Percent Family x Siblings	0.01*	(0.005)	0.01*	(0.005)
Founder	-0.31	(0.27)	-0.33	(0.27)
R&D Department	0.25	(0.21)	0.20	(0.22)
Company Size (log assets)	-0.11	(0.09)	-0.15	(0.12)
Company Age (years)	-0.04	(0.02)	-0.05	(0.02)
Task Order, second	0.45	(0.24)	0.48*	(0.24)
Task Order, third	0.18	(0.24)	0.22	(0.24)
Abstract	-0.51*	(0.21)	-0.45*	(0.21)
City, Nanjing	0.41	(0.33)	0.35	(0.33)
City, Changzhou	-0.62*	(0.32)	-0.66*	(0.32)
City, Shanghai	0.77*	(0.36)	0.77*	(0.37)
City, Wenzhou	0.39	(0.33)	0.33	(0.33)
Industry, Pharmaceuticals	0.55	(0.38)	0.53	(0.39)
Industry, Machinery	-0.36	(0.30)	-0.33	(0.30)
Industry, Transport Equip.	0.30	(0.31)	0.30	(0.31)
Industry, Electronics	0.10	(0.34)	0.14	(0.34)
Constant	5.59**	(2.11)	11.21***	(3.00)
Pseudo R^2	0.107		0.122	
Prob > Chi-Square	0.000		0.000	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ ***$p < 0.001$ Robust standard errors define test statistics.

SECTION S7: Network History

	Only current constraint		Plus Event 5		Plus Event 4	
	coeff	s.e.	coeff	s.e.	coeff	s.e.
Log Network Constraint	-0.71	(0.82)	-1.15	(0.82)	-1.57*	(0.78)
Low Success	-.36	(0.27)	-.38	(0.27)	-.36	(0.27)
Constraint with Low Success	1.74	(0.95)	2.55*	(1.04)	2.69**	(1.00)
Respondent & Business Controls						
Education	0.07	(0.10)	0.06	(0.10	0.06	(0.10)
Income	0.02	(0.05)	0.02	(0.05)	0.01	(0.06)
Age (decades)	-0.04	(0.16)	-0.03	(0.16)	-0.03	(0.16)
Female	0.13	(0.26)	0.13	(0.27)	0.12	(0.27)
Number of Siblings	0.08	(0.10)	0.07	(0.10)	0.07	(0.10)
Percent Family in Network	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.01)
Percent Family x Siblings	0.01*	(0.005)	0.01*	(0.005)	0.01*	(0.005)
Founder	-0.36	(0.26)	-0.39	(0.26)	-0.38	(0.27)
R&D Department	0.12	(0.21)	0.11	(0.21)	0.10	(0.21)
Company Size (log assets)	-0.17	(0.12)	-0.18	(0.12)	-0.17	(0.12)
Company Age (years)	-0.04	(0.02)	-0.04*	(0.02)	-0.05*	(0.02)
Task Order, second	0.48*	(0.23)	0.49*	(0.24)	0.53*	(0.24)
Task Order, third	0.20	(0.23)	0.19	(0.24)	0.21	(0.24)
Abstract	-0.30	(0.20)	-0.29	(0.20)	-0.28	(0.20)
City, Nanjing	0.40	(0.32)	0.41	(0.32)	0.40	(0.32)
City, Changzhou	-0.57	(0.31)	-0.56	(0.31)	-0.58	(0.31)
City, Shanghai	0.75*	(0.35)	0.78*	(0.35)	0.79*	(0.35)
City, Wenzhou	0.42	(0.33)	0.41	(0.33)	0.41	(0.33)
Industry, Pharmaceuticals	0.57	(0.37)	0.57	(0.37)	0.56	(0.37)
Industry, Machinery	-0.32	(0.29)	-0.30	(0.29)	-0.30	(0.30)
Industry, Transport Equip.	0.37	(0.30)	0.36	(0.30)	0.37	(0.30)
Industry, Electronics	0.14	(0.32)	0.16	(0.32)	0.15	(0.32)
Constant	4.37	(3.24)	6.24	(3.65)	7.86*	(3.44)
Pseudo R^2	.088		.093		.096	
Prob > Chi-Square	.000		.000		.000	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ ***$p < 0.001$ Robust standard errors define test statistics.

	Plus Event 3		Plus Event 2		Plus Event 1	
	coeff	s.e.	coeff	s.e	coeff	s.e.
Log Network Constraint	-2.14**	(0.77)	-1.79**	(0.65)	-1.90**	(0.63)
Low Success	-.33	(0.27)	-.30	(0.27)	-.25	(0.27)
Constraint with Low Success	3.09**	(0.98)	2.51**	(0.89)	2.51**	(0.88)
Respondent & Business Controls						
Education	0.06	(0.10)	0.06	(.10)	0.06	(0.10)
Income	0.01	(0.06)	0.01	(.05)	0.01	(0.06)
Age (decades)	-0.02	(0.16)	-0.03	(0.16)	-0.04	(0.16)
Female	0.10	(0.27)	0.06	(0.27)	0.04	(0.27)
Number of Siblings	0.05	(0.10)	0.05	(0.10)	0.05	(0.10)
Percent Family in Network	0.01	(0.01)	0.01	(0.08)	0.01	(0.01)
Percent Family x Siblings	0.01*	(0.005)	0.01*	(0.005)	0.01*	(0.005)
Founder	-0.38	(0.27)	-0.38	(0.26)	-0.37	(0.26)
R&D Department	0.11	(0.21)	0.13	(0.21)	0.14	(0.21)
Company Size (log assets)	-0.16	(0.12)	-0.15	(0.12)	-0.14	(0.12)
Company Age (years)	-0.05*	(0.02)	-0.05*	(0.02)	-.05*	(0.02)
Task Order, second	0.56*	(0.24)	0.54*	(0.24)	0.55	(0.24)
Task Order, third	0.21	(0.24)	0.21	(0.24)	0.20	(0.24)
Abstract	-0.28	(0.20)	-0.29	(0.20)	-0.30	(0.20)
City, Nanjing	0.41	(0.33)	0.41	(0.32)	0.41	(0.33)
City, Changzhou	-0.60	(0.32)	-0.61	(0.32)	-0.63*	(0.32)
City, Shanghai	0.82*	(0.36)	0.79*	(0.35)	0.81*	(0.36)
City, Wenzhou	0.43	(0.33)	0.44	(0.33)	0.43	(0.33)
Industry, Pharmaceuticals	0.62	(0.37)	0.60	(0.37)	0.62	(0.37)
Industry, Machinery	-0.28	(0.30)	-0.28	(0.29)	-0.28	(0.29)
Industry, Transport Equip.	0.38	(0.30)	0.38	(0.30)	0.38	(0.30)
Industry, Electronics	0.17	(0.32)	0.15	(0.33)	0.18	(0.33)
Constant	10.11**	(3.32)	8.59*	(2.84)	8.90**	(2.71)
Pseudo R^2	.102		.098		.099	
Prob > Chi-Square	.000		.000		.000	

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ ***$p < 0.001$ Robust standard errors define test statistics.